1: Cohen E-4,5 (1956-1965) 1967 MS14 Kanuri MS14

In later generations they often became a separate fief, or in some cases were absorbed into the territorial organization of the original fief. Again, the big lord might also settle some of his slaves in the fief, or he might ask to settle them in someone else's fief, or be asked by some other high ranking person if he would allow slaves to be settled in one of his own fiefs. Slaves delivered the results of their work on the land, and in craftwork directly to their own master whether this was the big lord of the fief or not. If they were in someone else's fief, presents were sent by their master to the senior fief-holder—the big lord—in the capital. It was also possible for the monarch or the big lord to settle holy men, men learned in the Koran, on a fief and such settlements were generally tax free.

There were two main taxes and innumerable smaller ones. Indeed, in the Kanuri language it is possible to denote the meaning of taxation, a tax on something, by simply adding the suffix "ram" to the activity or the object. Of the two main annual taxes, collected after the harvest, one went to the fief-holder and the other to the Shehu. The big lord collected tax on the basis of assessment of local produce by a special tax messenger who went out to the fief and after conferring with local leaders agreed on the tax. All who cooperated in tax collection kept some for themselves, passing surpluses on up the hierarchy to the big lord. In turn the fief-holder always gave gifts to the ruler upon receipt of their own fief-holder tax. Each year the Shehu appointed his own tax messengers from among the nobility and collected a royal tithe from the various fiefs. These men might and might not be fief-holders in their own right, but very often they were not collecting in their own fiefs. Other taxes were annual fees to local headmen, fees for clearing new land, for using new market space, for adjudication, for craftwork, for irrigation (where present), for extending any kind of privilege, etc. The system was essentially the same for the nomad groups, but one related complication should be noted. The people from dispersed localities owed some small taxation privileges to their previous headmen, even though they now lived in new settlements within new fiefs and were required to pay major taxes to their new settlement leaders.

One final point about the pre-colonial political system should be made. To understand such a kingdom it is necessary to keep distinct at all times the concept of a title from that of an office. The Kanuri kingdom had great rosters of noble titles that through time varied in number, numbers of holders per title, and the name of title. Some pre-nineteenth century titles such as the *Fufuma* or lord of the ancient capital city of Birni Ngazargamo dropped out of use. There were a number of men entitled Shettima while there was only one Digma or one Yerima. The titles are honorific, and even personal names which were attached to originally powerful households have become titles during Bornu's long history. Titles embellish a man' political duties, and even provide some opportunities for furthering his ambitions if their past history, or the activities of a title holder, enable him to manipulate the situation successfully for his own advancement. Offices on the other hand are positions in government giving the incumbent rights, duties, and obligations. An office may almost completely coincide with the title, as in the case of the ancient monarch whose title was Mai for probably a thousand years, and Shehu for the last century and a half. Or again offices can vary independently of titles. Thus the title of Digma which was held by a man with many official duties and much power in the mid-nineteenth century had changed by the end of the century, and the man

1: Cohen E-4,5 (1956-1965) 1967 MS14 Kanuri MS14

holding this title had very few of these offices left—they were now the rights of persons holding quite different titles.

The economy of Bornu was a semi-specialized one. Almost everyone grew some crops, except a few cattle nomads, but at the same time during the long dry season people carried on craftwork, trade, and other specialized activities, such as providing medical or barbering services, or entertainment for those who were willing to pay. Everyone had access to new land, over which a person might establish ownership by his act of clearing it. If he used the land for only a few years, and stopped, then the land passed back into bush with no owner. Continued long-term use, especially that involving inheritance, meant that the owner could do with it what he pleased and transfer it to whomever he pleased. In other words the Kanuri had property concepts of usufruct or use-right, but they also had notions of freehold or private property in which land could be transferred by an individual after he had used it for a long time, or it had been passed on to his heirs.

The people raised specialized crops in the kingdom and practiced a myriad of different crafts. Each local craft was organized into a craft guild that helped set production and price standards under a local craft leader who benefited economically from his position and tried to pass it down through the male line. Markets, too, were under headmen and all goods to be traded went to weekly markets to which came thousands of people from the surrounding area.

Trade was accomplished by barter for the most part, although several forms of currency developed, which can be called special purpose or limited purpose money. For various kinds of trade, and within limits, certain objects—a man's robe, iron bars, slaves, horses, cotton rolls, Maria Theresa dollars, and other items—could be used. The trans-Saharan trader came to Bornu for slaves; he therefore demanded payment in slaves, and slaves became a kind of currency for this trade. People from Bornu traded south of Lake Chad for iron bars. These bars could be used to purchase anything in the markets southeast of Bornu where they were the chief export commodity. The same thing is true of cloth in the southern areas of Bornu where it was manufactured and where it was a major export item. Cloth rolls purchased any number of commodities from Bornu but only in that north-south trade. Cowrie shells came very late to Bornu (1820–1850) and never achieved the success as currency that they did elsewhere.

Another and important method of distribution of goods was carried out within the political system itself. Political superiors gave out enormous quantities of cloth, food, horses, and robes on particular holy days or special events such as rites of passage, or wrestling matches. On one occasion a witness in the early part of the century watched the Shehu give away more than a thousand men's robes and an equal number of bullocks and sheep. Although one would expect the leaders to give more than other men, they also served as a model for the population so that the amount of distribution actually carried on in this way must have been very great indeed.

Another important facet of the economy was foreign trade. Although the famous trans-Saharan caravans are supposed to have declined during the nineteenth century, by all accounts they were still of considerable importance for Bornu. Into Bornu came calico, cotton prints, fine silk, sword blades, writing paper, looking glasses, needles, razors, scissors, knives, cheap jewelry, and guns mostly from Eu-

1: Cohen E-4,5 (1956-1965) 1967 MS14 Kanuri MS14

The lawan's son in Magumeri, like many others whose fathers have positions of authority, wisely avoids any active leadership in his father's administration. His job as the adult education organizer for a literary campaign in the entire district keeps him traveling much of the time, and he never interferes with the political organization which he may one day inherit. His father, on the other hand, is one of the few enthusiastic supporters of adult education and enforces the program vigorously in Magumeri since he knows this will help his son's career in the Bornu emirate government. If and when the son should ever replace his father, or gain some political office elsewhere in the kingdom, he would recruit many of his subordinates from the households of his father's followers. Thus superior-subordinate relations are often continued down the generations. Some fall by the wayside because there are always more potential followers available than needed, as the households of followers expand with their own children and clients. However since the son may choose any one within or beyond his father's administration he can insist on only the best performance and the most loyalty from those chosen. On the other hand, should the son not obtain his father's position, and not succeed in any other way in the political or economic life of Bornu, then his father's followers will begin to see that they must find places elsewhere for the younger members of their own households. When this happens the continuity of lawan's administration down the generations begins to disintegrate. This process is repeated at every level of the political hierarchy and lies near the core of political life in Bornu.

On a day-to-day basis the most important matters, especially in rural areas like Magumeri, are taken to the lawan. As we have seen in Chapter 5 he is a central figure in transferring land, using his office as a sort of registry for local land negotiations. He witnesses many marriages and divorces, and arbitrates disputes among those under his jurisdiction. Indeed most of the people living in Magumeri feel more secure about a decision they have made that might affect their neighbors if the matter is ratified and witnessed by a person in authority. Thus if a man in Magumeri village wishes to move his compound walls and expand his dwelling space, he speaks to his ward head about it, and they both go to the lawan to report the intended action. The lawan asks one or two of his followers to find out if the contiguous neighbors object, and if so on what grounds. If there is no objection the action is ratified; if some are forthcoming, then a judicial hearing results in which the lawan hears the case. What this means is that for almost everyone in Bornu, especially in the rural areas, an enormous number of everyday activities are taken through the political system when relations between households are at issue. This in turn means that the political system is close to and very involved with the daily lives of the people.

As a salaried official of the emirate government, the lawan collects taxes from all men over eighteen in the village area. This is based on property assessments of their capital in cash and kind for that particular year. Over-taxing is common in rural areas where the people are illiterate, and even when it is not done, the taxpayers believe it is common. If the over-taxing is too burdensome, it is known that complaints against the lawan to higher officials in Bornu can bring at least an investigation and perhaps lead to his dismissal.

There is no doubt that the lawan can punish people for not recognizing his

578 632 689 696 [159] [685]

If the lawan continued to adjudicate against him and gave him heavy fines, then he should request to take the case to a higher court. Thus the teacher wished his peasant-follower to make his peace with the lawan but if this were impossible, then higher authorities would be resorted to and the lawan's power bypassed. In other words the teacher felt that the political structure of the town should be respected but within limits.

Bukar's problem illustrates how a lawan can make reprisals when he feels that there has been some lack of recognition given to his authority by those under his administration. There are a large number of things in land matters, general disputes, ceremonials, divorces, default of bad debts, assault, housing, and commerce that come within his perview and intersect the lives of his people at a great many points and in many vulnerable ways. Therefore to thwart his authority and then remain within the orbit of his power without the possibility of reprisals would be impossible.

632 [642] [643]

Recruitment to the office of the lawan is officially carried out by appointment from the emirate government at the capital. There is an official investiture ceremony at the capital, as in the nineteenth century, in which the lawan receives a turban from the Shehu of Bornu. In general there is a tendency, but only a tendency, for lawans to inherit the position. Thus one of the male heirs of the lawan takes over his household site and becomes the new lawan after his death. A male heir can be anyone in the male line of the lawan although sons seem to be favored.

[634]

On the other hand many of the village areas have a history in which the office has gone to a number of men based on their particular relationship to the district head, the immediate superior of the lawan in the political hierarchy. Thus there is also a tendency for the lawan to be appointed from the ranks of the incumbent district head's followers so that the office also tends to shift from one agnatic descent group to another in relation to shifts in the person of the district head.

632 634 578 66

One other factor is important in the succession to a lawan's office. This has to do with the political allegiance of the lawan in the political hierarchy of Bornu emirate. If a lawan dies, or is dismissed, and he is not friendly to a new district head, then whether or not the district head attempts to replace him depends (a) on what are the lawan's political connections beyond that of his official superior, the district head, and (b) whether the new district head can procure the loyalty of the lawan and therefore enlist him into his own following. If a lawan has very powerful friends in the emirate, then the new district head could incur their wrath by getting the lawan out of office. A lawan is removed from his village area headship for a number of reasons although they can all be subsumed under three broad categories. First the political maneuverings of a district head who wishes to replace the lawan with his own followers. Secondly, excessive migration out of the village area, or complaints to higher officials by the peasants against the lawan, and thirdly, failure to raise enough taxes. These may, of course, be interrelated so that, for example, migration out of the village area would be spotted in the tax returns or by complaints resulting from the lawan's plan to cover up by taxing those who remain more than is bearable, thus bringing on complaints. However, if a lawan is responsive to his superiors, and does not mulct his peasants to the point of hardship, migration, and complaint, he has a fairly secure position in the Bornu political system.

[166] [651]

1: Cohen E-4,5 (1956-1965) 1967 MS14 Kanuri MS14

As in the example above there is a tendency for the district heads to appoint younger brothers to the post of lawan within their own districts. However this has its limits. In one case a lawan confidentially asked the British officials if he could be moved to a district away from the hegemony of his older brother, the district head. That same year (1935) there were a great many complaints by the peasants directed to British officials about the harshness of this particular district head's administration. He was warned but did not comply and was later dismissed. The younger brother sensed that trouble was brewing for the older brother and decided it would be more advantageous to his own career if he could move to another district and not get caught up in the difficulties his brother was creating by his lack of good administration. One district head remarked that he had tried to appoint his own brother in a previous district as lawan, but the young man had done a very bad job and it proved impossible for the district head to control him. The younger brother was finally deposed by the emirate government after his older brother was transferred to a new district. Later he came to his older brother in the latter's new district, hoping for another job as lawan in his brother's administration. However the older brother has no intention of doing so because, as he says, this younger brother is a bad man who oppresses his villagers when he gets a chance and this reflects back on the district head. Thus in Bornu the loyalty of brothers is ameliorated in the political system by the requirements of office.

As we have already noted, local representatives of the various Bornu Native Authority (emirate government) departments are stationed in the district capitals. These include people like the district chief scribe who keeps the books on revenue collection, the district judge, the school teachers, some native authority policemen, veterinary, forestry, and agricultural department representatives and so on. The list varies in length from district to district, but there is a general tendency for it to lengthen through time as the departments expand their programs and services. These officials are paid salaries and live in the district capital although they often get shifted from one district to another. Thus only one of these officials in Magumeri had been there for longer than four years and almost all of them had lived in at least three district capitals during the past ten years. They view themselves as a class apart from the local people; they are city bred or at least city educated; they share a common interest in state and national politics; and their mobility orients them to each other rather than to people outside the civil service. When asked who their best friends are they invariably mention other members of the emirate's civil service. Thus they form a class of urban cosmopolitans on the rural scene.

Their relations to the district head are complex and in some ways similar to that of the district head to his lawans when these latter are appointees of a previous district head. The native authority official is not necessarily a follower of the district head, and he does have a separate salary. Usually the official and the district head maintain a respectful but carefully measured social distance from one another. The local officials are often asked to eat at the compound of the district head which emphasizes their common urban upper-class membership and separateness as a group from the rural population. However, they generally do not become members of the district head's following. They have their own careers to follow, and though friendship with the district head is useful, it could also impede their success because of demands made upon them by the district head which might conflict with those of their own departmental superiors in the capital.

1: Cohen E-4,5 (1956-1965) 1967 MS14 Kanuri MS14

larly as his representatives. The wakil also makes regular visits to important emirate leaders and tries to maintain a constant check on political developments in the capital and the emirate as a whole. Through this organization and through the giving of gifts and hospitality to visitors and messengers from the capital, as well as cultivating high placed friends, the district head maintains and builds up a communication network through which he obtains a many-sided picture of events in the capital.

District heads are also linked to the capital by their membership in factions that help to make up the political life of the emirate. In pre-colonial times these factions grew out of the allegiance of nobles to the various segments of the royal lineage. This indeed was the reason the succession disputes to the throne could turn into bloody civil wars. These same traditional factions still exist today, but there have been added new ones which involve close alliances between very powerful men in the emirate government. These reflect the weakened authority of the Shehu, and the increase in power and authority of the Native Authority officials in the top positions of the emirate government. District heads linked to more powerful factions receive better information about the course of emirate politics and more protection when they need it than those related to weak ones. Thus one district head might be linked to a member of the royal family who has no official position in the Native Authority and who has little hope of gaining the throne; another might be closely linked to the Waziri or chairman of the Bornu Native Authority Council. The latter district head, because of his factional membership, is in a much stronger position in the emirate political organization as a whole than is the former. These links to the center both official and unofficial must be carefully developed and maintained by a district head. This is especially true when it is realized that a district head like any other member of the Bornu political system operates within two cultural orientations—one western and the other traditional Kanuri. The district head should give gifts to subordinates, to his faction leaders, and to many other powerful people in the state. From a western point of view these can be seen as bribes, while from a Kanuri vantage point they may be looked upon as obligatory and legitimate recognition by the district head of the power and protection that can be wielded by his superiors in the central government of the emirate. Since such expenses are not provided for in the district head's official salary, the means by which he obtains the wealth to make such gifts often involves breaking rules according to strict western civil service standards, although again such activities might be considered legitimate by local tradition.

The central focus of this behavior revolves around tax collection. The district head is seen in western terms to be an agent of government who collects taxes and is paid a salary for this and other services. However, he needs to maintain a large following who are not provided for by government if he is going to collect nomad cattle taxes. These men must ride out over the entire district—often several thousand square miles—to collect the tax. To keep these men as his tax collectors he needs much more revenue than his own salary. If he does not collect the tax, or enough taxes, he will be punished by dismissal or transfer to a smaller less prestigious district. He has very little choice; in order to keep his own organization going and to maintain friendly contact at the center by gift-giving, he must take some of the district's tax revenue for himself. This makes him vulnerable at all times; to comply with some demands which are deemed important he must break others

1: Cohen E-4,5 (1956-1965) 1967 MS14 Kanuri MS14

which he hopes are less important. Furthermore, as in any bureaucracy, standards and their enforcement change through time, often as a result of changing personnel at the top. A new council member may have become interested in school latrines and suddenly start forcing compliance with the rules about such things. Failure to do so or to hear about the stringency with which the old previously unimportant policies are now being enforced could bring trouble to the district head who failed to comply. This is why information about policy and the cultivation of powerful friends in the central government is so important for the district head.

Before leaving the rural area a word should be said about adjudication. All leaders in the Bornu political system adjudicate disputes, and the political hierarchy itself serves as an appeals court system. Thus a peasant can take his dispute with a neighbor to his bullama (hamlet or ward head), who may decide to take the case up to the lawan (village area head), who in turn may decide to take the case to the district head. The district head may further decide to send the case over to the district court, and, if necessary, the district court can send the case into the capital city, to the court of the chief alkali of Bornu (chief judge's court). People can go directly to the judge's or district court, and in the city many do. Even with very serious cases like murder which must go into the central court in the city, the people taking the murderer into the city court most often go up the political hierarchy reporting the case each time they see another official even though there is no adjudication, thus giving recognition to their political leaders rather than going directly to a higher court.

Cases are tried by a combination of Muslim law and local custom. The chief or judge listens to the case, and if three witnesses swear for one side in a dispute but not the other, then the side whose witness has sworn wins the case. If no one swears evidence or too many people swear on both sides, then the judge listens while his assistant in the court interrogates the parties involved. The judge, whoever he may be, then makes a decision. Very often the interrogation itself tends to move the evidence towards one side in a dispute or another. Usually if a crowd gathers, one can see by simply listening to the crowd which side of the court case is winning the argument. On the whole decisions are just unless there have been previous and difficult relations between the adjudicator and any of the parties concerned. Swearing evidence in a court is called "eating the Koran"; that is to say, a person must swear on the holy book. If he tells a lie, it is believed that his hand will shrivel and he will die of horrible diseases. This belief is widespread and it is genuinely feared that the traditionally implied consequences of lying in court are in fact quite true.

The Organization at the Center

In Maiduguri at the eastern end of the royal plaza is the palace of the Shehu, flanked on one side by the mosque and on the other by the official residence of the Waziri or chief minister of the emirate. The Shehu is the formal head of government. All measures, policies, appointments made within the state are in his name; titles are granted at official investiture ceremonies carried on in the royal palace and he is the formal leader of the religious community of the state. This is em-

614 178 is Shetima Mastafa, the Ajia of Kukawa. The head of the Kanembu Tamagəri, is Alhaji Mai Manga of N'Guigmi, in Niger, not in [648] [643] Nigeria. When Alhaji Mai Manga was appointed chief of his region by the French authorities the Shehu of Bornu, in British Nigeria, sent him a gown (kulugu) as his mark of office. It was necessary for him to obtain the traditional approval of the [363] Shehu before he could be accepted by the populace. The heads of Shuwa and Fulani jilis are given kulugus by the Shehu, which indicates the political nature of the jili, or sib. However, the heads of the Kanuri jilis today have no functions whatsoever. People come to pay them respect (nogəna) as a result of their position, but this is all that remains attached to the position.

F. The System of Social Stratification.

175 565 The old Kanuri system of social stratification recognized four distinct social classes. These were royalty (ngalwo), aristocracy (kəntuoma), commoners (talaka), and slaves (kalya). One can distinguish four separate variables, which, when taken together, determine the social importance of any category of individuals. These are: power, wealth, respect, and freebirth; among the Kanuri they can serve as criteria for determining the rank of a social class, or of a single individual within a class.

121 61 • 66 565 Power is a quality which can be used to define a social relationship, and which derives from the political structure

121 61 .66 565 of a society. In societies where the state as an institution does not exist, political structure is either coterminous with kinship structure, or there is close co-ordination between the two. In the case of the Kanuri, the separate and distinct administrative organization which serves as the framework of the political structure,[1] implies a lessening of the role of kin groups to the point where they have disappeared among the Kanuri. Aside from relationships within the nuclear family, and to a lesser extent kinship relations generally, power derives its authority, among the Kanuri, from one's position in the political system, and the ability of one man to exert power over another is determined by the roles which the two men play in the political system.

121 556 565 Wealth as a variable used to determine the social importance of a single individual or of a category of individuals is analogous to power. Relative wealth defines a relationship between two individuals or two classes of individuals, and just as power derives from one's role in the political system, wealth derives from one's role in the economic system. In most primitive societies, the economic system is submerged within kinship and within the operation of kin groups. In some, the market has begun to emerge as a separate economic institution and increasingly social relationships are defined in terms of the market.

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1. the distinctions made here as to types of political systems are taken from the Introduction to African Political Systems, edited by Meyer Forres and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, (London: Oxford University Press, 1940).

his allegiance to the Ajia who might otherwise be tempted to replace him with one of his own men.

The kabuna represent a special category in the administration of the district. The colonial administration makes no provision for the kabuna; they are not NA appointees as are all the other officeholders mentioned above; they receive no salary. Yet, the services which they perform are vital if the district bureaucracy is to continue to function smoothly. The kabuna represent a traditional Kanuri social category whose roles are primarily in the political sphere. The roles of the kabuna have been slightly modified and adapted to the modern situation, but the relationship between kabuna and Ajia and between kabuna and populace is a traditional one and is once again typical of the persistence of the old social stratification system into the present.

Yerima Mustapha has fifty-nine kabuna at Geidam. Some are slaves; some are free. Many have been with Yerima for years and years. Head of all the kabuna is Wakil Ali, a slave. The kabuna are each given a house to live in, a horse belonging to Yerima, a plot of land to farm, and ceremonial trappings for themselves and for their horses. In turn, they swear allegiance to Yerima and work for him.

2. A history of important office-holders in Geidam.

The present town of Geidam is on the site of an old town called Dəmjeri. Five miles to the west of the present Geidam

[GEIDAM]

175 632 634 was a very young man, whose father had been a Lowan under Kaigama before him. In fact, years earlier Geidam had had one Lowan instead of three--and the single Lowan had been the grandfather of Lowan Kagu. Then the town was split into three wards, each with its Lowan. At that time, Lowan Ashek, who had been a kabuna of Kaigama's and his slave as well, became a Lowan. Lowan Kagu's father was also made Lowan of a ward, succeeding his father; and the young Lowan Kagu in turn succeeded his father at his father's death.

175 632 634 66 The Lowans of Geidam were loyal to the departed Kaigama, but now it was necessary to demonstrate that they could transfer their loyalty to Yerima Mustapha, the new Ajia of Geidam and their new master. Lowan Ashek, an older and more experienced man, was able to do this. He became one of Yerima's kabuna, and while he is far from the most trusted of Yerima's men, he continues to serve as Lowan under Yerima since he knows the people of his ward well and had been performing the job for some years. Lowan Kagu was young, and was unable to control his feelings in the face of strains created by the situation. He, too, might have bridged the difficult transition as Lowan Ashek had done, had he had more experience in office. As it was, he was dismissed shortly after Yerima's arrival because he lost his temper in an argument with Yerima and threw a book in his face.

Yerima was then free to appoint one of his own men to replace Lowan Kagu. When he was approached and asked whom he

175 wished to have as the new Lowan, he replied that he was indif-
632 ferent. The name of Kolo Kolo was then submitted to the town
634 council, the only name submitted. Eight council members voted
• 66 for Kolo Kolo as new Lowan; two wrote in other names. Kolo
Kolo then became the new Lowan. He had been a resident in Gei-
dam for twenty years before Yerima came to the town, and had
been an important dilelma dealing in cows. Kolo Kolo is of
the same family as Yerima's mother. When Yerima came to Gei-
dam as Ajia, Kolo Kolo joined him as a kabuna, one of the more
important kabuna. At the first opportunity he was made a
Lowan. He is a good choice as Lowan as he has long been a res-
ident of Geidam, and is acceptable to the townspeople. At the
same time, he is a kabuna of Yerima's, and is completely devoted
to Yerima, who made it all possible. Yerima bears no grudge
against Lowan Kagu. He specifically states that if Lowan Kagu,
who is still a young man, has learned from the experience and
can demonstrate through his behavior that his attitudes have
changed, he may well be appointed Lowan again, should a future
opportunity arise. Indeed, it appears that Yerima would wel-
come this, were he assured of Lowan Kagu's loyalty to him, as
it would smooth over old rifts and would restore Lowan Kagu
to a position which had long been in his family and to which
he was entitled.

692 The courts in Bornu are intended, theoretically, to oper-
697 ate independently from the political arm of government, and in
particular to be free of all influence from the Ajias. The

693 Maiduguri. He also holds the post of Alkali for Maiduguri
554 District. Replacing Alkali Baba Kura in Geidam was another young man, Alkali Tijani Nanami, whose father had also been the Alkali in Geidam years earlier, in 1939-1940. Thus the same families tend to retain their positions of power and
[66] prestige in the social system. If the past can serve as a reliable guide, Yerima will again further the career of the new Alkali, so long as he sees that his help is appreciated and rewarded by proper reciprocal behavior, and in this way the close bond which he has always seemed to create and maintain with Alkalis in his district will serve to smooth the way in the administration of his district.

3. The Role of Authority Figures: Sholo.

627 A very widespread Kanuri method of obtaining in-group
692 justice is through the arbitration of disputes by a person in a position of authority. This practice is called sholo. Disputants within a particular craft or occupation will go to the head of their craft group for arbitration. The head of the zogors arbitrates disputes between zogors. The Lowan arbitrates disputes within his ward or his village. The wakil has disputants brought to him; he then presents them before the Ajia
[618] for sholo. The Alkali will settle disputes out of court. The British officially forbade Lowans and Ajias from hearing cases
[719] and arbitrating in disputes. However, Alkali Baba Kura says that according to the Koran, the settlement of disputes through

651 cattle is to deal directly with the Ardos and Mais, bribing
634 them with gifts to come into the district. This is highly im-
563 proper, as the Fulani of a district are considered a part of
662 that district. Movement of Fulani from one district to another merely alters the source of jangali, but does nothing to increase the total amount which flows into the central NA treasury. Indeed, one source of concern to Yerima is that the Fulani Ardos of Geidam District will hear that the Ajia of Magumeri District, which is directly south of Geidam and shares with it a long unprotected border, has an inadequate number of horsemen, and will move south into Magumeri District out of reach of Yerima's kabuna, to avoid paying jangali. Should such a movement out of his district occur, Yerima would notify the Waziri in Maiduguri, who would in turn force Digma to patrol his side of the border to prevent the Fulani from moving unnoticed into his district. It is clear, however, that Yerima is not above offering inducements to Fulani Ardos to move into his territory and increase his tax lists.

651 Yerima's overall scheme depends on the stationing of im-
634 portant kabuna who are in charge of jangali collection in their
563 areas. These are as follows:
662

Grema Jisami - responsible for all the territory north of the Yobe River.
Kolo Kime - responsible for the area around Gumsa, and all the Fulani under Mai Musa.
Aba Chiari - responsible for the area around Kusur, and all the Fulani under Mai Kusur.
Kangadi - responsible for the Maganuwa area, and the Fulani under Mai Maganuwa.
Kazella Dokalia - responsible for the Zurukuduk area, but with no single Fulani Mai in his area.

[GEIDAM]

651 Mai Mar, the fourth important Fulani Mai does not have as-
634 signed to him a kabuna in charge of jangali collection from
563 his people. All other kabuna remain located in Geidam town,
66 and are sent out to particular areas on demand. The primary method used by Yerima is to send out horses to areas in which cattle are reported. One aspect of Aba Chiari's job is to let Yerima know if Fulani are crossing over into Magumeri District, as his area is along the Geidam-Magumeri border.

Yerima is willing to reach a compromise in assigning jangali payment to a particular Ardo or Mai which is below the full amount according to the actual count of cattle belonging to his group. If the Ardo is willing to accept Yerima's assessment, then both sides benefit: Yerima benefits because his kabuna have less work to do and can turn their attention elsewhere where it may be needed, the Ardo benefits because the total jangali is less for his group than it would be if every cow were counted. It is through such methods that the Fulani Ardos are induced to remain in Geidam or to come to Geidam should they find themselves in the district of an Ajia who is erratic or uncompromising. Should the Ardo feel that he can get away with paying less jangali than the amount assigned to him by Yerima, on the basis of information given him by his chief kabuna, he might try to hide cattle or to sneak away. Then Yerima would descend on his people with many kabuna and every single head of cattle would be counted and taxed. The threat of Yerima's many kabuna makes this an unwise course of action,

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651 and Yerima has actually carried out the threat often enough
634 for all to know that he means business. It is much wiser and
563 easier to compromise, and to receive gifts for having compro-
66 mised, than to curry the Ajia's disfavor. In this way Yerima maintains harmonious relations with the Fulani in his district, and indeed with the Kanuri villagers as well, and satisfies the demands of the central authorities at the same time. The system is dependent on the work of Yerima's kabuna, who in turn are supported by Yerima. Ultimately funds to support Yerima's sixty odd kabuna come from tax funds, though this never appears in the accounting of taxes. Absolute loyalty to Yerima is demanded of all his kabuna. A kabuna found helping himself from [64] Jangali, or using his position to extract money from villagers for himself, is severely dealt with.

5. The Roles of N.A. Personnel.

178 The roles of a number of political figures have been dis-
63 cussed in some detail above. In particular, the roles of Ajia and kabuna, of Lowan, and of Alkali have been examined and in every case it can be seen that traditional Kanuri roles have [63] persisted into the present. The smooth functioning of the political system of Geidam has been attributed to the ability of individuals carrying out those roles, particularly of Yerima Mustapha, in perpetuating traditional relationships and adapting those relationships to the changing present.

634 However, in looking at the list of office-holders in Gei-
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